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In the net neutrality proceeding at the FCC and in Verizon v. 
FCC,1 Internet access service providers contended that the First 
Amendment applied to any regulation of their provision of Internet ac-
cess service.  As Susan Crawford notes in First Amendment Common 
Sense,2 this argument, if accepted, would have enormous ramifications: 
any regulation of the services offered by Internet access providers 
would be subject to heightened scrutiny (and strict scrutiny if it was 
content based).  I focused on this issue in a previous article, and came 
to the same basic conclusion that Crawford does.3  Using broadly ac-
cepted legal sources, which for the First Amendment means primarily 
Supreme Court jurisprudence,4 the Internet access providers’ argu-
ment is quite weak.  The Court has treated the scope of the First 
Amendment expansively, but there is no real basis for contending that 
mere transmission of bits is “speech.” 
Although I largely agree with her bottom line, a list of our agree-
ments would be boring.  Instead, I want to focus on two considerations 
Crawford introduces in her analysis that I think are largely irrelevant: 
Internet access providers’ economic interests and their potential status 
as common carriers.  In focusing on these two considerations, I believe 
Crawford distracts from the question whether Internet access provid-
ers are engaging in substantive communication.  This is the key ques-
tion under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. 
As to the first consideration, in section II(B) of her article Crawford 
attributes significance to the fact that the Internet access providers’ in-
terests are “primarily economic.”5  I think this is irrelevant under the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and normatively.  Many newspapers 
are owned by publicly traded companies answerable to shareholders, 
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but First Amendment jurisprudence appropriately treats that as  
immaterial.6 
I think the relevant question under the prevailing jurisprudence 
turns on what Internet access providers are doing or want to do.  Spe-
cifically, as Crawford notes, under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
First Amendment coverage seems to require a speaker who seeks to 
transmit some substantive message or messages to a listener who can 
recognize that message.7  And that’s all.8  The Court has never found a 
substantive communication that was sendable, receivable, and actually 
sent to be outside First Amendment coverage unless it fell into one of 
the Court’s articulated exceptions.  And the Supreme Court has inter-
preted those exceptions narrowly.  The Court’s jurisprudence in recent 
years has made that particularly clear.  In United States v. Stevens,9 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,10 and United States 
v. Alvarez,11 the Supreme Court addressed arguments in favor of 
broadening, or broadly construing, exceptions to First Amendment 
coverage.  In each case the Court rejected such arguments, construing 
the exceptions quite narrowly and thus construing the First Amend-
ment’s coverage very broadly.12 
Importantly, the requirement of a message that is sendable and re-
ceivable and that one actually chooses to send means that if Internet 
access providers (or FedEx, or any other transmitter of speech) are 
willing to engage in substantive editing, then I think First Amendment 
scrutiny will apply to regulation of those activities.  If an Internet ac-
cess provider is willing to say, “We give you an edited Internet — the 
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Internet we think you want,” I think they are engaged in speech under 
the prevailing jurisprudence. 
But under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence it has to be editing 
that sends a substantive message.  As I discussed in an earlier article, 
document delivery is an illustrative analogy.  FedEx offers different 
delivery speeds for documents, with higher prices for faster speeds.  
Documents are covered by the First Amendment, but it is difficult to 
see how a statutory ban on this differential pricing would raise First 
Amendment issues.  Transporting documents does not entail a com-
munication, and thus the First Amendment would not seem to encom-
pass FedEx’s deliveries.  It would be different if a company devoted 
its transportation of documents to messages with which it agreed.  If, 
for example, a document transport company decided to deliver only 
documents to and from Democratic-affiliated groups, delivery would 
likely entail a communication.  Every delivery would communicate to 
the recipient that a group that shared its political orientation was 
sending it a document.  But for a transport company like FedEx that 
does not so limit itself, there is no similar message.  FedEx’s delivery 
of a document communicates no information about the content of that 
document.13 
The interesting question is what else constitutes a substantive mes-
sage.  Does blocking spam and malware constitute communication, 
and therefore speech for First Amendment purposes?  It depends.  A 
transmitter protecting its own network is engaged in nonsubstantive 
editing.  But protecting users from receiving material that upsets them 
is substantive editing.  It may be that the transmitter’s filter is content 
neutral, but if its reason for blocking the content is substantive, then it 
is engaged in substantive editing.  And if the transmitter communi-
cates such substantive blocking to its users, that would seem to satisfy 
the requirements for communication and thus for the freedom of 
speech.  This means that, to determine whether the First Amendment 
applies to an Internet access provider’s decision to block spam and 
malware, a court must determine why the provider engaged in such 
blocking.  Does the provider block to keep its network running effi-
ciently, or also because it believes that its customers do not want the 
blocked content?  If it blocks for substantive reasons (such as to pro-
tect its customers from content they do not want), does it communicate 
that to customers?  Does it advertise itself as a company that “blocks 
material that you would not like” (or words to that effect)?14 
In her conclusion Crawford says she is concerned that if Internet 
access providers start to charge some edge providers, “They will be, in 
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fact, exercising editorial discretion.  They will have succeeded in 
recharacterizing their own activities for First Amendment purposes, all 
on their own.”15  As I indicated above, I don’t agree that charging 
more for some users is editorial discretion.  If so, then every company 
that charges different prices is engaged in speech by doing so, a result 
I do not find credible.  But I also don’t agree that there is any particu-
lar significance to whether or not they start engaging in true substan-
tive editing.  Either way, they can say they want to engage in substan-
tive editing, and that’s enough for First Amendment purposes. 
Turning to the other consideration that I think is irrelevant, in sec-
tion II(A) Crawford argues that Internet access providers are in actual-
ity common carriers.16  And she suggests that the idea is that Internet 
access providers will “escape[] all forms of oversight by virtue of mere 
administrative classification.”17  As the discussion above suggests, I 
think this focus on administrative or statutory categories is misplaced, 
both under the prevailing jurisprudence and normatively.  In deter-
mining what is “speech” under the First Amendment, the Supreme 
Court has not relied on categories like “common carriage,” but instead 
has looked to see exactly what the alleged speakers do.  Congress could 
tomorrow pass legislation compelling Upworthy and Reddit to give 
equal priority to all messages.  The applicability of the First Amend-
ment to Upworthy and Reddit would in no way depend on whether 
Congress also characterized them as “common carriers” in that legisla-
tion.  And this is as it should be.  If an entity is engaged in pure 
transmission of bits, I don’t think it is engaged in speech, regardless of 
whether we call it a “common carrier” or a “banana.” 
This also highlights a fundamental agreement between Crawford 
and me — how radical the Internet access providers’ argument is.18  If 
transmitting bits constitutes “speech,” then the telephone companies in 
the twentieth century were speakers for First Amendment purposes, 
and their lawyers were fools not to have challenged common carriage 
as an infringement on its speech rights.  In reality, the Supreme Court 
has always required substantive communication or self-expression as a 
requirement for the application of the First Amendment.19 
The discussion so far has focused on the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence.  Now let me take a step away from that jurisprudence.  We cer-
tainly could eliminate any possibility of Internet access providers being 
speakers for First Amendment purposes if we were willing to bite the 
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bullet and settle on an underlying theory of the First Amendment, and 
that theory did not extend to substantive editing by Internet providers.  
But any such theory would entail a significant reshaping of First 
Amendment coverage.  We could decide that corporations can’t be 
speakers.  But newspapers and magazines are owned by corporations, 
so excluding them would be a radical change.  As I noted above, ex-
cluding speech for economic reasons would knock out for-profit own-
ers of newspapers and magazines.  What about limiting the scope of 
the First Amendment to government actions with a censorial motive?  
Then we would have to investigate, and be confident we could discern, 
actual government motivation.  And we would protect the blunderbuss 
legislature that has no censorial motive and doesn’t care about speech. 
If we really want to prevent Internet access providers from being 
speakers, we are going to have to radically reshape the Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and understandings.  Maybe 
that is what we need.  But I do not think fears about Internet access 
providers’ claims support an overhaul of the Court’s jurisprudence, in 
light of what the jurisprudence actually is. 
Is there anything short of revamping we should do?  I think so.  In-
sofar as we are concerned about the expansiveness of First Amendment 
coverage, we may want to limit it in two areas of genuine uncertainty: 
editorial decisions that are neither obvious nor communicated to the 
reader, and laws that single out speakers but do not regulate their 
speech.  (The D.C. Circuit has treated regulation of the rates cable op-
erators charge their customers as raising First Amendment issues.20) 
Even with those limitations, however, an enormous and growing 
amount of activity will be subject to heightened scrutiny absent a fun-
damental reorientation of First Amendment jurisprudence. 
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